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The Application of the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act to Appearance Regulations That Presumptively 
Prohibit Observant Sikh Lawyers From Joining the 
U.S. Army Judge Advocate General Corps 
Rajdeep Singh Jolly* 
PURPOSE 
Observant Sikh lawyers are presumptively prohibited from joining the 
U.S. Army Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps because they cannot sa-
tisfy the Army’s appearance regulations.  This essay argues that this pre-
sumptive prohibition violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA).  Under RFRA, the federal government may substantially burden 
an individual’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that its applica-
tion of the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest by the least 
restrictive means.1  The Army’s appearance regulations are designed to 
promote two interests—uniformity and safety.  In the course of furthering 
these interests, the Army’s appearance regulations effectively preclude ob-
servant Sikhs from joining the U.S. Army JAG Corps.  The Sikh religion 
requires its male followers to wear turbans and forbids all of its followers 
from cutting their hair.  Both requirements purportedly interfere with the 
Army’s asserted interests in uniformity and safety.  This purported interfe-
rence forms the basis for a conclusion that observant Sikhs are appropriate-
ly excluded from joining the U.S. Army JAG Corps.  This essay argues 
against the necessity of such a conclusion by demonstrating that under 
RFRA (1) the Army does not have a compelling interest in disallowing ex-
ceptions to its appearance regulations, and (2) the Army’s appearance regu-
lations do not constitute the least restrictive means of promoting safety.  
Because the Army’s appearance regulations violate RFRA, they must be 
amended to allow for the accommodation of observant Sikhs in the U.S. 
Army JAG Corps. 
OBSERVANT SIKHS IN CONTEXT 
As of 2006, there were approximately 25 million Sikhs in the world.2  
* I wish to thank Professor Davison Douglas of the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the Col-
lege of William & Mary for his support and several others who helped me shape this project, including 
Christopher Jones, Christopher Byrne, Manbir Singh Chowdhary, Col. G.B. Singh, Maj. Glenn Har-
wood, Prof. Stephen Sapp, Prof. Ken Goodman, William Durbin, and Donald Judy. 
 1 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2000). 
 2 Worldwide Adherents of All Religions, Mid-2005, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, 
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9432620/Worldwide-Adherents-of-All-Religions-Mid-2005 (last 
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The overwhelming majority of them live on the Indian subcontinent.3  In 
contrast, only an estimated 251,000 live in the United States.4  The forma-
tive phase of Sikh history began with Guru Nanak (1469–1539),5 the 
founder of Sikhism, and continued for two centuries under the leadership of 
nine successive Gurus.6  The last of these Gurus, Guru Gobind Singh 
(1666–1708),7 presided over a transformative phase of Sikh history; Guru 
Gobind Singh not only vested permanent spiritual authority in the Sikh 
scripture—the Adi Granth—but also inaugurated a fellowship of orthodox 
Sikhs—the Khalsa—which “provided a visible insignia and an explicit dis-
cipline which members of the community could renounce only at the cost 
of virtual excommunication.”8  One of the most conspicuous components 
of the Khalsa code of discipline is a prohibition on hair-cutting.9  In prac-
tice, even among Sikhs who do not live in complete accordance with Khal-
sa traditions, a turban and unshorn hair are important marks of a Sikh 
male’s personality.10  These identifiers link the Sikh community and also 
serve as “a declaration of privilege [and] also of the intent to be prepared 
steadfastly to uphold the ideals [that Guru Gobind Singh] had demar-
cated.”11  Those who decline to accept these aspects of the Sikh identity are 
 
visited Sept. 14, 2007). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Religious Adherents in the United States of America, 1999–2005, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 
ONLINE, http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9432619/Religious-Adherents-in-the-United-States-of 
America-1900-2005 (last visited Sept. 14, 2007). 
 5 See W.H. MCLEOD, Guru Nanak and the Sikh Religion, in SIKHS AND SIKHISM 1, 1–5 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 1999) [hereinafter Guru Nanak]. 
 6 Id. at 1.  The basis of Sikh theology, according to Professor McLeod, is: 
a belief in a personal God, the omnipotent Creator of the universe, a Being beyond time 
and human comprehending yet seeking by His grace the salvation of man and for this pur-
pose revealing Himself in His own creation.  To the offer of salvation man is called to re-
spond by a life of meditation on the divine self-revelation and of conformity to it. If man 
responds he progressively grows into the likeness of God and ultimately into an ineffable 
union with [Him].  If he refuses he follows the path of spiritual death and remains firmly 
bound to the wheel of transmigration. 
Id. at 5–6. 
 7 AMANDEEP SINGH MADRA & PARMJIT SINGH, WARRIOR SAINTS: THREE CENTURIES OF THE 
SIKH MILITARY TRADITION 7 (1999). 
 8 Guru Nanak, supra note 5, at 1, 2.  Professor McLeod suggests that these two features—the 
immutable scripture and the recognizable insignia—have preserved Sikhism from irrevocable dissolu-
tion.  Id. at 3.  According to Professor McLeod: 
The Khalsa is best described as an order, as a society possessing a religious foundation and 
a military discipline.  The religious base was already in existence and a military tradition 
had been developed, but something much stronger was required.  The military aspect had to 
be fused with the religious, and this Guru Gobind Singh achieved by promulgating the Or-
der of the Khalsa . . . . 
W.H. MCLEOD, The Evolution of the Sikh Community, in SIKHS AND SIKHISM, supra note 5, at 1, 4. 
 9 W.H. MCLEOD, Who is a Sikh?, in SIKHS AND SIKHISM, supra note 5, at 1, 121 [hereinafter 
Who is a Sikh?]  According to one author, observant Sikhs refrain from cutting their hair to “affirm that 
the body, as divinely created, is sacrosanct in its completeness.” ELEANOR NESBITT, SIKHISM: A VERY 
SHORT INTRODUCTION 54 (2005). 
 10 Sardarni Premka Kaur, Rahit Maryada, in 3 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF SIKHISM 424 (Harbans 
Singh ed.,1997). 
 11 Id.  See also MAX ARTHUR MACAULIFFE, 5 THE SIKH RELIGION: ITS GURUS, SACRED 
WRITINGS AND AUTHORS 89 (S. Chand & Co. 1963) (noting that Guru Gobind Singh “always held the 
JOLLY_155-182_JAM 3/27/2008 10:30 AM 
2007] The Religious Freedom Restoration Act 157 
                                                                                                                                     
still regarded as Sikhs, “but only on the understanding that they are failing 
to discharge customary duties.”12  In other words, to the extent that Sikhs 
decline to wear a turban and decline to keep their hair unshorn, they are not 
regarded as observant Sikhs. 
Sikhs have earned recognition for martial prowess in the course of 
their history.13  An estimated 100,000 Sikhs served in the British armed 
forces during World War I, disproportionately forming around twenty per-
cent of the total number of volunteers from India.14  Over 83,000 observant 
Sikh soldiers died and more than 109,000 were wounded in the cause of the 
Allies during both World Wars,15 and five observant Sikhs were awarded 
the Victoria Cross for gallantry in these conflicts.16  Observant Sikhs still 
serve in the armed forces of India17 and are presumptively permitted to 
serve in the armed forces of Canada18 and the United Kingdom.19 
Unlike their coreligionists elsewhere in the world, and as explained in 
greater detail below, observant American Sikhs who wish to wear the uni-
form of their country do not presumptively enjoy this privilege.20 
 
belief that it would be proper and advantageous to his Sikhs to wear long hair . . . .”). 
 12 Who is a Sikh, supra note 9, at 121. 
 13 See MADRA & SINGH, supra note 7, at vii.  Writer Pico Iyer partially summarized the military 
evolution of Sikhs as follows: 
With his people being persecuted by Mogul warlords, [Guru] Gobind [Singh] formed a 
fierce fraternity of “warriors of God” known as the Khalsa (Pure).  As the Sikhs cleaved to 
[Guru] Gobind [Singh’s] martial principles, the tales of their valor and ferocity became le-
gion. They routed the Afghans at the Battle of Attock in 1813, and in 1849 they delivered a 
stinging defeat to the British at the Battle of Chillianwala.  After they were forced to suc-
cumb to superior British firepower six weeks later, the Sikhs became among the sturdiest 
and trustiest men of the British army: during the great Indian Mutiny of 1857, the raj was 
kept alive by their support. After the British slaughtered nearly 400 civilians, many of them 
Sikhs, at Amritsar in 1919, the warriors changed allegiances and joined the crusade to bring 
down the raj. Sikh soldiers and policemen have, to this day, loyally protected their Hindu 
compatriots all over India. 
Pico Iyer, The Lions of Punjab, TIME, Nov. 12 1984, at 53. 
 14 MADRA & SINGH, supra note 7, at 110. 
 15 Id. at 41 (quoting General Sir Frank Messervy, Foreword to F.T. BIRDWOOD, THE SIKH 
REGIMENT IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR. (1953)). 
 16 MADRA & SINGH, supra note 7, at 158. 
 17 See D.S. Sandhu, The Sikh Regiment: Indian Army’s Most Decorated Regiment, 3 BHARAT 
RAKSHAK MONITOR, May–June 2001, http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-
6/sandhu.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2007). 
 18 See CANADIAN FORCES GRIEVANCE BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 2004, at 27 (2004), available at 
http://www.cfgb-cgfc.gc.ca/pdf/ar2004_revised-e.pdf. 
 19 See UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, GUIDE ON RELIGION AND BELIEF IN THE MOD 
AND ARMED FORCES 13 (2005).  As detailed in subsequent portions of this essay, the right of English 
Sikhs to wear the uniform of their country is conditioned on the satisfaction of technical requirements, 
which might preclude observant Sikhs from serving in certain capacities in limited circumstances.  See 
id.  Even still, what English Sikhs enjoy—and what American Sikhs do not—is the right to be presump-
tively accommodated in the armed forces of their country. 
 20 See U.S. DEP’T. OF DEF., ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICES WITHIN THE MILITARY 
SERVICES, DIRECTIVE NO. 1300.17, at 3 (1988) available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/ 
corres/pdf/130017p.pdf [hereinafter DIRECTIVE NO. 1300.17] (effectively excluding Sikhs from the 
scope of religious apparel accommodations in the U.S. Armed Forces by excluding hair and grooming 
practices required or observed by religious groups from the class of exempt religious apparel.). 
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NOTES ON THE SCOPE OF THIS ESSAY 
This essay argues for the accommodation of observant Sikh lawyers in 
the U.S. Army JAG Corps.  This narrow focus is premised on two assump-
tions, the second of which qualifies the first.  In the first place, there is in-
stitutional precedent and, accordingly, a greater practical possibility of ac-
commodating observant Sikhs in the Army.  Between 1958 and 1981, the 
Army specifically permitted observant Sikhs to enlist through a special ex-
emption from its appearance regulations.21  After this exemption ended in 
1981, prior grantees of the exemption were permitted to remain in uniform, 
provided that they were “otherwise eligible for continued service.”22  In 
addition, prior grantees are subject to assignment restrictions.23  Even still, 
the significance is that the Army is familiar with the religious commitments 
of observant Sikhs.  Secondly, notwithstanding this history of accommoda-
tion, it is arguably the case that institutional change in the Army and other 
armed forces will face less opposition if such change is implemented in a 
piecemeal fashion.  As discussed in greater detail below, opposition to the 
accommodation of Sikhs in the Army stems from concerns about opera-
tional requirements in the military.24  Allaying these concerns may be easi-
er if the question of accommodating observant Sikh lawyers is successfully 
addressed before the knottier issue of accommodating observant Sikhs who 
seek to serve primarily as combatants. 
REASONS FOR APPEARANCE REGULATIONS IN THE MILITARY 
The presumptive preclusion of observant Sikhs from the U.S. Army 
JAG Corps is based on the inability of observant Sikhs to satisfy the Ar-
my’s current appearance regulations.25  These regulations are based on the 
military’s interests in uniformity26 and safety.27  In 1984, pursuant to a 
congressional amendment to that year’s Department of Defense Authoriza-
tion Bill,28 the Department of Defense established a Joint Service Study 
Group on Religious Practice (Joint Study Group),29 which was tasked with 
 21 Captain Thomas R. Folk, Military Appearance Requirements and Free Exercise of Religion, 98 
MIL. L. REV. 53, 62 (1982).  The exemption for observant Sikhs was codified in the Army’s appearance 
regulations between 1972 until its rescission on August 20, 1981.  Id. at 62 n.65. 
 22 Religious Exceptions in Army Uniform End, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1981, at 13.  In effect, the 
accommodation of observant Sikhs in the U.S. Army was downgraded from rule to exception. 
 23 U.S. DEP’T. OF ARMY, ARMY COMMAND POLICY, ARMY REG. 600-20, at 34 (2002) available 
at http://www.first.army.mil/eo/pdf/r600_20.pdf [hereinafter ARMY REG. 600-20] (“[S]oldiers previous-
ly granted authority to wear unshorn hair, unshorn beard, or permanent religious jewelry will not be 
assigned permanent change of station or temporary duty out of [the Continental United States] due to 
health and safety considerations.”). 
 24 Religious Exceptions in Army Uniforms End,  supra note 22. 
 25 See DIRECTIVE NUMBER 1300.17, supra note 20. 
 26 JOINT SERVICE STUDY GROUP ON RELIGIOUS PRACTICE, JOINT SERVICE STUDY ON RELIGIOUS 
MATTERS MARCH 1985, at III-4 (1985) [hereinafter RELIGIOUS PRACTICE]. 
 27 Id. at III-7. 
 28 Memorandum from Deputy Secretary Taft to Secretaries of the Military Departments (Oct. 12, 
1984) [hereinafter Taft Memorandum], reprinted in RELIGIOUS PRACTICE, supra note 26, at A-4. 
 29 Dwight H. Sullivan, The Congressional Response to Goldman v. Weinberger, 121 MIL. L. 
REV. 125, 137 (1988). 
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studying the possibility of modifying appearance regulations to accommo-
date religious practices in the armed forces.30  The Joint Study Group is-
sued its report in March 1985,31 and its examination of the military’s inter-
ests in uniformity and safety forms the basis for the following discussion. 
A. The Army’s Interest in Uniformity 
According to the Joint Study Group, uniforms “act as a cohesive bond 
within the services by instilling a common identity, by providing visual 
evidence of shared experience, and by reinforcing a sense of tradition.”32  
These factors are said to play “an essential role in the development of unit 
cohesion and institutional esprit de corps, which in turn contribute to mili-
tary effectiveness.”33  As well, “[u]niformity not only directly imposes the 
discipline of the group, but, more subtly, instills the self-discipline neces-
sary for the military member to perform effectively.”34  Non-uniformity, on 
the other hand, may result in polarization, which “fractures the [military] 
unit along lines that are irrelevant to and destructive of military considera-
tions.”35  In other words, because uniformity “induces the wearers to view 
themselves as part of a group larger than themselves,”36 and because “the 
extent to which individuals retain old dress and appearance habits reduces 
their identity with and commitment to the new group,”37 it is possible that 
non-uniformity can “create an impression that [an] individual is unwilling 
to subordinate personal desires to traditional military values and raise ques-
tions of ultimate dependability in a crisis.”38  Put another way, exceptions 
to appearance regulations may create “perceptions of favored treatment for 
some military members, or the feeling that some individuals were ‘getting 
over’ on the system, [and] would almost certainly be disruptive.”39  The 
foregoing arguments can be condensed into the proposition that uniformity 
has a psychological and behavioral impact on operational effectiveness.40 
In the course of suggesting a connection between uniformity and op-
erational effectiveness, the Joint Study Group offered several additional 
reasons for preserving uniformity.  First “[w]hen perceived favored treat-
ment is linked to a potentially emotional issue such as religion, the possibil-
                                                          
 30 Taft Memorandum, supra note 28, at A-4. 
 31 Sullivan, supra note 29, at 137. 
 32 RELIGIOUS PRACTICE, supra note 26, at III-5. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at III-4. 
 35 Id. at III-10. 
 36 Id. at III-4. 
 37 Id. at III-9. 
 38 Id. at III-11.  The Joint Study Group acknowledged, however, that “[s]uch impressions are 
most likely when the individual is not well-known to the other members of the group.”  Id.  By implica-
tion, if observant Sikhs were presumptively permitted to join the U.S. military, these impressions might 
not be so strong. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See id. at III-4. (“In the course of this outward display of group membership, the individual 
servicemember develops a willingness to submit his or her individuality to the larger organization and 
thus thinks and acts differently.”). 
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ity of prejudice exists.”41  One might argue that prejudice would disrupt es-
prit de corps and consequently have an adverse impact on operational ef-
fectiveness.  Second, uniformity reinforces “the idea that military members 
are different from civilians,”42 and “remind[s] the men and women who 
wear them that they put aside certain personal freedoms when they joined 
the armed forces and that they have assumed special obligations inherent in 
the military’s responsibility for the nation’s defense.”43  It is possible that 
non-uniformity undermines esprit de corps to the extent that it simulta-
neously accentuates civilian distinctions and undermines professional 
equality among military members.44  Third, “permitting certain faith groups 
openly to display their religious preference and to identify with a particular 
religion (and in some cases ethnic group) might cause other groups to as-
sert more vocally and visibly their commitment to their particular faith.”45  
In other words, it is feared that departures from uniformity will lead to a 
slippery slope situation and generate unwieldiness of a sort that would not 
only create “chao[s] in combat”46 but also “discourage others from entering 
what they perceive as no longer a ‘sharp’ military organization.”47  The 
Joint Study Group ultimately concluded that, as a matter of policy, “it 
would be unwise to permit visible exceptions to uniform dress and appear-
ance standards . . . .”48 
B. The Army’s Interest in Safety 
According to the Joint Study Group, safety standards not only “direct-
ly affect the individual’s health and well-being,”49 but also “affect the abili-
ty of the individual to perform a task.  This, in turn, influences the accom-
plishment of the unit’s mission in both peace and war.”50  Of particular 
relevance to observant Sikhs is their ability (or inability, as the case may 
be) to wear protective equipment.  For example, within the military, there is 
hesitation about permitting dress and grooming standards that would pre-
vent the formation of “an effective seal on a protective mask or which 
would otherwise fail to ensure complete protection in a toxic environ-
                                                          
 41 Id. at III-12. 
 42 Id. at III-4. 
 43 Id. at III-4–5. 
 44 Id. at III-7. 
 45 Id. at III-12. 
 46 See id. at III-13. 
 47 See id. at III-14. 
 48 Id. at III-19.  The Joint Study Group justified its conclusion as follows: 
While uniformity will not, in itself, establish cohesion and military spirit in the absence of 
other factors, both sociological studies and historical experience clearly indicate it does 
play a very important role in creating and maintaining the spirit of a military force.  The 
potential negative impacts on identification and discipline, on cohesion and esprit de corps, 
and on the public image of the military services would outweigh the possible benefits to the 
individuals involved or to the service of permitting visible religious expression within the 
military context. 
Id. 
 49 Id. at III-7–8. 
 50 Id. at III-8. 
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ment.”51  As of 1985—the year in which the Joint Study Group released its 
report—”test results and testimony from experts in chemical protection . . . 
overwhelmingly concluded that an effective seal is not possible with a 
beard.”52 
To the extent that protective equipment cannot function on a bearded 
individual, one might argue that the individual should be free to subject 
himself to the risks that ordinarily compel the use of protective equip-
ment.53  Anticipating this argument, the Joint Study Group determined that 
it would not be feasible “to permit the individual to determine the risk to 
which he is willing to put himself,”54 because, “[g]iven the interdependen-
cy of all activities within the military, what would be at stake would not be 
merely one individual, but the lives of others as well as the accomplishment 
of the mission.”55  To the extent that protective equipment cannot function 
on a bearded individual, one might argue that the individual should be as-
signed roles not likely to require the use of protective equipment.56  Antic-
ipating this argument, the Joint Study Group suggested that assignment re-
strictions could harm military esprit de corps.57  Finally, to the extent that 
protective equipment cannot function on a bearded individual, one might 
argue that the individual should be allowed to maintain a beard until its 
modification or removal is compelled by extenuating circumstances.58  An-
ticipating this argument, the Joint Study Group rejected it on two grounds: 
(1) “it opens the possibility of individuals questioning . . . their command-
er’s judgment of what constitutes an emergency situation”59 and (2) “there 
would be no way to ensure [that] the individual would live up to his com-
mitment when circumstances did so dictate.”60 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at III-15. 
 53 Id. at III-16. 
 54 Id. 
 55 RELIGIOUS PRACTICE, supra note 26, at III-16. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at III-17.  The Joint Study Group explained the problem as follows: 
[A]doption of assignment restrictions . . . would, in essence, create two classes within the 
military: the majority, subject to all the demands the military makes on its members (in-
cluding worldwide assignment and the possibility of serving in a combat environment), and 
a visible minority, exempt from certain of the more onerous demands of the institution but 
eligible for all of its benefits.  The impact of such an arrangement on the attitude of both 
groups can only be speculated, but it seems likely the overall effect would harm military 
esprit de corps. 
Id. at 16–17.  In practice, observant Sikhs in the U.S. Army are subject to assignment restrictions.  
ARMY REG. 600-20, supra note 23, at 34 (“[S]oldiers previously granted authority to wear unshorn hair, 
unshorn beard, or permanent religious jewelry will not be assigned permanent change of station or tem-
porary duty out of [the Continental United States] due to health and safety considerations.”). 
 58 RELIGIOUS PRACTICE, supra note 26, at III-17.  This is the approach taken by the British armed 
forces.  UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 19, at 13. 
 59 RELIGIOUS PRACTICE, supra note 26 at III-17. 
 60 Id.  Against this, one could argue that it is never possible to ensure that any individual will live 
up to his or her commitments.  In a military context, there is always a danger that a soldier will fail to 
live up to his or her commitments to the detriment of operational effectiveness; accordingly, it is not 
clear why the military should recruit or train anyone at all. 
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THE LAW OF RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN THE U.S. MILITARY 
A. Goldman v. Weinberger 
The Goldman case concerned Dr. Simcha Goldman, an Orthodox Jew 
and ordained rabbi who actively served in the U.S. Air Force as a clinical 
psychologist between 1977 and 1981.61  Until 1981, Dr. Goldman was not 
prohibited from wearing his yarmulke on the base where he worked.62  
Throughout his service, Dr. Goldman consistently received outstanding 
evaluations from his superiors, who even recognized him for professional-
ism in dress.63  In April 1981, Dr. Goldman testified as a defense witness at 
a court-martial while wearing his yarmulke.64  Opposing counsel subse-
quently complained about the yarmulke to the commander of the hospital 
where Dr. Goldman worked, noting that wearing it on duty constituted a 
violation of Air Force appearance regulations.65  In response, the hospital 
commander ordered Dr. Goldman to refrain from wearing a yarmulke off 
base while on duty; when Dr. Goldman refused and protested through an 
attorney, the hospital commander enjoined Dr. Goldman from wearing a 
yarmulke at any time while on duty.66  After receiving a reprimand and a 
threat of a court-martial, Dr. Goldman filed suit, claiming that the Air 
Force regulations at issue infringed upon his First Amendment right to 
practice his religion.67  The case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
where a five-to-four majority of the Court upheld the preclusive appearance 
regulations.68 
The result in Goldman stemmed from a principle of judicial deference 
to military judgment.69  Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist articu-
                                                          
 61 Goldman v. Sec’y of Def., 734 F.2d 1531, 1532–33  (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff’d, 475 U.S. 503 
986
eligious significance to several co-workers and patients who inquired.” Sec’y 
.2d at 1533. 
ion in the health clinic and by wearing his service cap over the yarmulke when out of 
oors.
t opposing counsel’s complaint may 
 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
ity opinion). 
(1 ). 
 62 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 505 (1986).  According to the D.C. Court of Appeals, 
“[n]either before [Goldman’s] joining the Air Force nor during his first three and one-half years in the 
service was he informed that wearing a head covering in addition to his uniform was problematic, al-
though he did explain its r
of Def., 734 F
 63  Id. 
 64 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 505.  Until 1981, Goldman “avoided controversy by remaining close to 
his duty stat
d ”  Id. 
 65  Id.  In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens suggested tha
have had a retaliatory motive.  Id. at 511
 66  Id. at 505 (major
 67  Id. at 505–506. 
 68  Id. at 509–10. 
 69  Id. at 507.  This principle found expression in the Supreme Court’s 1974 decision in Parker v. 
Levy, which “[upheld] a service member’s conviction for making disloyal statements . . . .”  Major John 
P. Jurden, Spit and Polish: A Critique of Military Off-Duty Personal Appearance Standards, 184 MIL. 
L. REV. 1, 21 (2005).  Writing for the majority in Parker, Justice Rehnquist observed that “the military 
is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society” and that it has, “by necessity, de-
veloped laws and traditions of its own during its long history.”  Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 
(1974).  The legal upshot of this observation is that “fundamental necessity for obedience, and the con-
sequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which 
would be constitutionally impermissible outside it.”  Id. at 758.  In other words, “[w]hile members of 
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lated this principle as follows: “[W]hen evaluating whether military needs 
justify a particular restriction on religiously motivated conduct, courts must 
give great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities 
concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest.”70  In 
other words, “review of military regulations challenged on First Amend-
ment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar 
laws or regulations designed for civilian society.”71  This deference was 
motivated at least in part by the Goldman majority’s concern about being 
“ill-equipped” to determine the extent to which a religious accommodation 
would impact discipline in the military.72  According to Justice Rehnquist, 
“[t]he considered professional judgment of the Air Force is that the tradi-
tional outfitting of personnel in standardized uniforms encourages the sub-
ordination of personal preferences and identities in favor of the overall 
group mission.”73  In other words, because “[u]niforms encourage a sense 
of hierarchical unity,”74 and because “the necessary habits of discipline and 
unity must be developed in advance of trouble,”75 the “Air Force considers 
them as vital during peacetime as during war. . . .”76  Notwithstanding the 
preclusive impact of the appearance regulations at issue in Goldman, the 
majority in Goldman ultimately concluded that the regulations “reasonably 
and evenhandedly regulate[d] dress in the interest of the military’s per-
ceived need for uniformity.”77 
 
the military community enjoy many of the same rights and bear many of the same burdens as do mem-
bers of the civilian community, within the military community there is simply not the same autonomy 
as there is in the larger civilian community.”  Id. at 751. 
 70 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507. 
 71  Id.  As noted by Justice Blackmun in his dissent in Goldman, the then-prevailing “civilian” 
standard of constitutional review in free exercise cases required the state to justify an impairment of 
religious liberty by showing that the impairment was the least restrictive means of achieving a compel-
ling state interest.  Id. at 525 (Blackmun J., dissenting). 
 72  Id. at 507 (majority opinion). 
 73  Id. at 508. 
 74  Id. 
 75  Id. 
 76  Id. 
 77  Id. at 510.  The majority decision in Goldman drew strong dissents.  Justices Brennan and 
Marshall lamented what they regarded as the majority’s adoption of “a sub-rational-basis standard—
absolute, uncritical ‘deference to the professional judgment of military authorities.’”  Id. at 515 (Bren-
nan J., dissenting).  According to Brennan and Marshall, “[w]hen a military service burdens the free 
exercise rights of its members in the name of necessity, it must provide, as an initial matter and at a 
minimum, a credible explanation of how the contested practice is likely to interfere with the proffered 
military interest.”  Id. at 516.  Justice Blackmun applied this principle to the case at hand in a separate 
dissent, opining that “the Air Force . . . failed to produce even a minimally credible explanation for its 
refusal to allow Goldman to keep his head covered indoors.” Id. at 526 (Blackmun J., dissenting).  Dis-
senting separately, Justice O’Connor criticized the majority for rejecting Goldman’s claim “without 
even the slightest attempt to weigh his asserted right to the free exercise of his religion against the inter-
est of the Air Force in uniformity of dress within the military hospital.”  Id. at 528 (O’Connor J., dis-
senting).  In general, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O’Connor agreed that a military service can justi-
fy a contested regulation only by showing that it furthers a compelling state interest by the least 
restrictive means.  Id. at 516 (Brennan J., dissenting); Id. at 530 (O’Connor J., dissenting). 
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el is neat and conservative.89  These details found expression 
B.  The Congressional Response to Goldman v. Weinberger 
The Goldman majority pointed out that “[j]udicial deference. . .is at its 
apogee when legislative action under the congressional authority to raise 
and support armies and make rules and regulations for their governance is 
challenged.”78  Pursuant to this constitutionally-delegated authority,79 sev-
eral members of Congress responded to the Goldman decision by propos-
ing legislation designed to permit members of the armed forces to wear 
“neat and conservative” religious apparel if such apparel does not interfere 
with military duties.80  Rooted in efforts that began in response to Dr. Sim-
cha Goldman’s 1984 loss in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia,81 the proposal was eventually approved in 1987 by Congress 
and signed into law by President Reagan82 before its codification as 10 
U.S.C. § 774.83  Under this statute, the general rule is that “a member of the 
armed forces may wear an item of religious apparel while wearing the uni-
form of the member’s armed force.”84  The general rule does not apply, 
however, in two circumstances: (1) if it is determined “that the wearing of 
the item would interfere with the performance of the member’s military du-
ties,”85 or (2) if it is determined “that the item of apparel is not neat and 
conservative.”86  The statute directs the armed forces to “prescribe regula-
tions concerning the wearing of religious apparel by members of the armed 
forces. . . .”87  Pursuant to this delegation of authority, the armed forces 
must not only determine whether religious apparel significantly interferes 
with military duties88 but also develop criteria for determining whether re-
ligious appar
                                                          
 78  Id. at 508 (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)). 
 79 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . to make Rules for the 
ver-
ional response to Goldman v. Weinberger, see Sullivan, supra note 29, at 147. 
oposal was tabled in 1986 by a 51–49 vote.  Id. at 142. 
4(a) (2000). 
 
n itself to be sensitive to both service-
and the military’s needs. 
, at 147. 
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces . . . .”). 
 80 132 CONG. REC. 14, 19801 (1986) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).  For a comprehensive o
view of the congress
 81 Id. at 135. 
 82 Id. at 147.  The pr
 83 Id. at 147 n.144. 
 84 10 U.S.C. § 77
 85 § 774(b)(1). 
 86 § 774(b)(2). 
87 § 774(c).  One commentator explained the significance of 10 U.S.C. § 774 as follows: 
In adopting the religious apparel accommodation legislation, Congress indicated that it is 
more disposed to protect servicemembers’ religious apparel interests than is the Depart-
ment of Defense.  Yet both the legislative process and the statute which it produced dem-
onstrate congressional caution when dealing with the military’s internal regulations.  Con-
gress took three years to adopt the accommodation statute.  Before legislating its own 
solution, Congress called for the Department of Defense to study the issue, a clear but al-
most unheeded signal for the Department of Defense to adopt religious apparel accommo-
dation regulations.  When Congress did finally act, it chose not to legislate specific regula-
tions.  Instead, Congress relied on the Department of Defense to carry out a loosely defined 
policy of accommodation.  Congress has thus show
members’ liberty interests 
Sullivan, supra note 29
 88 § 774(b)(1). 
 89 § 774(b)(2). 
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in 1988 when the Department of Defense issued Directive Number 
1300.17.90 
The Directive applies to all branches of the armed forces and governs 
the accommodation of religious practices within the military.91  In pertinent 
part, the Directive permits members of the armed forces to “wear visible 
items of religious apparel while in uniform, except under circumstances in 
which an item is not neat and conservative or its wearing shall interfere 
with the performance of the member’s military duties.”92  The Directive 
defines “religious apparel” as “articles of clothing worn as part of the doc-
trinal or traditional observance of the religious faith practiced by the mem-
ber.”93  To emphasize that “religious apparel” only includes “articles of 
clothing,” the Directive excludes “[h]air and grooming practices required 
or observed by religious groups” from its definition of “religious appa-
rel.”94  In doing so, the Directive prevents observant Sikhs from satisfying 
its requirements.  Notwithstanding this, the Directive grants military com-
manders discretion to approve r qe uests for religious accommodation in in-
dividual cases;95 however, the Army almost categorically forbids religious 
accommodations for uncut hair.96 
It has been suggested that 10 U.S.C. § 774 “was specifically designed 
to allow Jewish servicemembers to wear yarmulkes and Sikh service-
members to wear turbans.”97  This proposition is based on statements in 
that statute’s legislative history that address the accommodation of Sikhs in 
ECTIVE NO. 1300.17, supra note 20, at 1. 
t 3. 
 
in determining whether to grant a request for accommodation of reli-
rms of individual and unit readiness, 
ure. 
r requests, including treatment of similar re-
ests made for other than religious reasons. 
. at
ntal United States] due to health and safety considerations.” ARMY REG. 
00-2
ivan, supra note 29, at 148–49. 
 90 DIR
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 2. 
 93 Id. a
 94 Id. 
95 Id. at 3–4.  According to the Directive, 
[M]ilitary commanders should consider the following factors along with any other factors 
deemed appropriate 
gious practices . . .  
[1] The importance of military requirements in te
health and safety, discipline, morale, and cohesion. 
[2] The religious importance of the accommodation to the requester. 
[3] The cumulative impact of repeated accommodations of a similar nat
[4] Alternative means available to meet the requested accommodation. 
[5] Previous treatment of the same or simila
qu
Id  4. 
 96 U.S. DEP’T. OF ARMY, UNIFORM AND INSIGNIA: WEAR AND APPEARANCE OF ARMY UNIFORMS 
AND INSIGNIA, ARMY REG. 670-1 at 2-3 (2005) [hereinafter ARMY REG. 670.1].  The Army created an 
exception to this categorical rule as follows: “As an exception, policy exceptions based on religious 
practice given to soldiers in accordance with AR 600-20 on or prior to 1 January 1986 remain in effect 
as long as the soldier remains otherwise qualified for retention.”  Id.  Army Regulation 600-20, in turn, 
reads in pertinent part as follows: “[S]oldiers previously granted authority to wear unshorn hair, un-
shorn beard, or permanent religious jewelry will not be assigned permanent change of station or tempo-
rary duty out of [the contine
6 0 supra note 23, at 34. 
 97 Sull
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ervant Sikhs 
is evinced fu  
H
commodation of observant Sikhs in the U.S. Armed Forces.100 
the compelling interest test and by expressly applying it to laws of general 
the Army.98  If the proposition is correct, then the Department of Defense 
and U.S. Army effected a significant departure from congressional intent 
by promulgating appearance regulations that effectively disqualify obser-
vant Sikhs from military service.  Upon closer examination, however, the 
legislative history that eventuated in 10 U.S.C. § 774 reflects tentativeness 
about accommodating observant Sikhs in the military.99  That Congress did 
not wholeheartedly intend to pursue the accommodation of obs
rther by an unsuccessful attempt by Representative Dennis
astert in 1990 to amend 10 U.S.C. § 774 to expressly allow for the ac-
THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT’S APPLICABILITY TO THE 
MILITARY 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) sought to in-
validate any state or federal law that substantially burdens a person’s exer-
cise of religion unless such a law furthers a compelling governmental inter-
est by the least restrictive means.101  RFRA was enacted in response to the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division, Department of 
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, according to which “generally ap-
plicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a particular 
religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental inter-
est. . . .”102  Prior to Smith, the compelling interest test was an established 
means of resolving federal cases involving religious liberty and competing 
government interests.103  RFRA effectively overturned Smith by codifying 
                                                          
 98 Id. 
 99 For example, while addressing arguments that greater religious accommodation in the military 
would impair esprit de corps, Senator Frank Lautenberg—a leading proponent of the religious apparel 
amendment—observed that “[i]n the United Kingdom, Sikh members of the services are permitted to 
wear turbans, and to keep their hair long, if they choose” but then immediately clarified that “we are not 
advocating that.” 132 CONG. REC. 14, 19802 (1986) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) (emphasis added).  
Senator Lautenberg made the same argument the following year but dropped the italicized language. 
133 CONG. REC. 18, 25250 (1987) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).  Senator Arlen Specter expressed his 
views as follows: “If there were to be a head dress, if there were to be a turban, that might not be so 
bad.  Certainly, when you consider what is meant by the yarmulke, a very small skullcap, that does not 
nel and Compensation, a subsidiary of the House Committee on Armed Services, from which it 
never .C. § 
774: 
ligion. The Secretary concerned may not determine 
under subsection (b)(2) that a turban worn as an item of religious apparel by a member who 
. 
on Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2000). 
ith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990). 
interfere with the ability of some of the military to perform their service.” 132 CONG. REC. 14, 19803 
(1986) (statement of Sen. Specter) (emphasis added). 
 100 H.R. 5672, 101st Cong. (1990).  In 1990, the bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Military 
Person
 emerged.  See id.  If successful, the bill would have added the following provision to 10 U.S
(d) HAIR, BEARDS, AND TURBANS OF SIKHS- The Secretary concerned may not re-
gulate the length of hair, or the appearance of facial hair, of a member of the armed forces 
who is a Sikh if that regulation would abridge the exercise of the religious faith of that 
member under the tenets of the Sikh re
is a Sikh is not neat and conservative. 
Id
 101 Religious Freedom Restorati
 102 Employment Div. v. Sm
 103 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000). 
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s sweepingly to all federal law and implementations 
of fe
 declares that RFRA applies 
ope of 
                                                          
applicability.104  In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. 
Flores concluded that RFRA cannot constitutionally apply to state law.105  
Notwithstanding this, in 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court in Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal ratified the settled judg-
ments of numerous appellate courts106 that RFRA still applies to federal 
law.107  RFRA applie
deral law, “whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before 
or after [RFRA].”108 
On its face, RFRA does not exempt the U.S. military from the compel-
ling interest test.109  In general, RFRA imposes limitations on the federal 
“government,” which encompasses any “branch, department, agency, in-
strumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the 
United States. . . .”110  This definition facially applies to the Department of 
Defense and, by implication, to the military branches—including the Army.  
Although RFRA’s legislative history expressly
to the military,111 a closer examination is required to ascertain the sc
RFRA’s applicability to the military. 
A.  Ascertaining the Scope of RFRA’s Applicability to the Military 
The Senate Judiciary Committee’s report on RFRA noted that “the 
[federal] courts have always extended to military authorities significant de-
ference in effectuating . . . [military] interests.”112  The Committee then de-
clared its intention and expectation that “such deference” continue under 
RFRA.113  The House Judiciary Committee’s report on RFRA was not as 
categorical.  After noting the importance of respecting the “expertise and 
authority” of military officials,114 the House report declared that, under 
RFRA, “[s]eemingly reasonable [military] regulations based upon specula-
tion, exaggerated fears . . . [or] thoughtless policies cannot stand.”115  Sig-
 104 §§ 2000bb, 2000bb-1. 
 105 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
 106 O’Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Young, 141 F.3d 854, 
856 (8th Cir. 1998); Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th Cir. 2002); Kikumara v. Hurley, 242 
F.3d 950, 959 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 107 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct 1211, 1216 (2006). 
 108 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3 (2000). 
 109  See §§ 2000bb-1, 2000bb-2 (2000). 
 110 § 2000bb-2 (emphasis added). 
 111 H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 8 (1993) (“Pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the 
courts must review the claims of . . . military personnel under the compelling governmental interest 
test.”); S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 12 (1993) (“Under the unitary standard set forth in the act, courts will 
review the free exercise claims of military personnel under the compelling governmental interest test.”). 
 112 S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 12. 
 113 Id. 
 114 H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 8 (1993).  According to the House report, applying the compelling 
interest test to military regulations “does not mean the expertise and authority of military . . . officials 
will be necessarily undermined.”  Id.  This is so, according to the House report, because “maintaining 
discipline in [the] armed forces, [has] been recognized as governmental interests of the highest order.”  
Id. 
 115 Id. 
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es that 
appli ilitary appearance regulations. 
in preserving “motivation, image, morale, discipline and esprit de corps,” 
nificantly, the Senate Judiciary Committee’s report on RFRA adopted a 
similar stance with respect to regulations based on “speculation, exagge-
rated fears, or post-hoc rationalizations,” but only with respect to prison 
regulations.116  The notion that military regulations must be justified on the 
basis of something other than speculation, exaggerated fears, or thoughtless 
policies is not significant because, the Senate Judiciary Committee applied 
this justificatory standard only to prison r
d to apply the standard to military regulations. The consequent failure 
of the Senate and House reports to comport with each other with respect to 
the standard detracts from its significance. 
Notwithstanding this divergence, both reports expressed an expecta-
tion that courts applying RFRA will construe the compelling interest
neither “more stringently [n]or more leniently than it was pr
Smith.”117  The next section of this essay examines two pre-Smith cas
ed the compelling interest test to m
B. Two Pre-Smith Applications of the Compelling Interest Test to 
Military Appearance Regulations 
In Bitterman v. Secretary of Defense, the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia addressed the constitutionality of Air Force regula-
tions that prohibited an active duty air traffic controller from wearing a 
yarmulke in uniform.118  Sergeant Murray Bitterman—the complainant—
filed suit after being denied permission to wear a yarmulke.119  Although 
the Air Force conceded that a yarmulke would not interfere with Bitter-
man’s air traffic control duties,120 and notwithstanding the testimony of a 
former Air Force physician, who wore a yarmulke during active duty,121 
the District Court upheld the Air Force regulations after applying a compel-
ling interest test.122  According to the District Court, the Air Force asserted 
two compelling interests: (1) a compelling interest in “the effective func-
tioning and maintenance of the Air Force,”123 and (2) a compelling interest 
                                                          
 116 See S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 10 (1993). 
 117 H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 7 (1993); S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 9 (1993). 
erman v. Sec’y of Def., 553 F. Supp. 719, 720 (D.D.C. 1982). 
 1
om ental interest,” id. at 724, and “an important governmental interest.”  Id. at 726. 
 118 Bitt
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 721. 
22 Id. at 724–26.  The District Court articulated the test as follows: 
[I]n order to withstand judicial review, the regulation in question, although presumptively 
valid, must protect a substantial governmental interest overshadowing the First Amendment 
right that is being circumscribed.  Further, the regulation must regulate no more conduct 
than is reasonably necessary to protect the substantial governmental interest asserted; yet 
this strict standard of review is to be tempered by the substantial deference to be accorded 
military judgments as to the appropriate ways in which to further a compelling interest . . . . 
Id. at 723–24.   In its opinion, the District Court inconsistently characterized the governmental interest 
at issue as “a substantial governmental interest,” a “substantial compelling governmental interest,” a 
“c pelling governm
 123 Id. at 724. 
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which are “essential to the efficient functioning and operation of the Air 
Force.”124  According to the District Court, permitting departures from Air 
Force appearance regulations would “adversely affect the promotion of 
teamwork, counteract pride and motivation, and
le, all to the detriment of the substantial compelling governmental in-
terest of maintaining an efficient Air Force.”125 
The District Court also concluded that the appearance regulations at 
issue were the least intrusive means of furthering the Air Force’s asserted 
interests.126  This conclusion was motivated in part by the District Court’s 
assumption of the following analytic stance: in determining the intrusive-
ness of the challenged regulation, “[i]ts effect upon the religious practices 
of all Air Force personnel must be considered, not just its effect upon the 
wearing of a yarmulke” by a single individual.127  After assuming this ana-
lytic stance, the District Court posed an extreme hypothetical, in which the 
Air Force promotes uniformity by requiring all personnel to adhere to the 
same religion or to no religion.128  Because the actual regulations at issue 
sought to promote uniformity while permitting personnel to adhere to at 
least some form of religion, they were less restrictive than they hypotheti-
cally could have been.129  The District Court went further than this, howev-
er, by concluding on the basis of its hypothetical
 the least restrictive means of promoting uniformity130 and, derivative-
ly, operational effectiveness in the Air Force.131 
The District Court went even further in the course of upholding the 
contested regulations.  Drawing on an interpretation of Jewish religious 
law,132 the District Court opined that Bitterman’s desire to wear a yarmulke 
was a “religious preference” instead of a religious requirement.133  This, 
according to the District Court, supported the
ons constituted the least restrictive means of promoting uniformity and 
operational effectiveness in the Air Force.134 
In Sherwood v. Brown, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
addressed the constitutionality of Navy regulations that prohibited an enlis-
tee from remaining in uniform after his adoption of Sikhism.135  Ronald 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 724–25. 
 126 Id. at 725. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 See id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 724. 
 132 Id. at 725.  In support of the notion that wearing a yarmulke constitutes a religious preference 
instead of a religious requirement, the District Court cited a footnote from The Concise Code of Jewish 
Law, according to which a Jew is permitted to go bareheaded, “especially where one’s livelihood is in-
volved . . . inasmuch as covering the head is prescribed by custom but not demanded by law.” Id. (quot-
ing 1 GERSION, APPEL, THE CONCISE CODE OF JEWISH LAW 34 n.3 (1977)) (emphasis added). 
 133 Id. at, 726. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Sherwood v. Brown, 619 F.2d 47, 48 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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onclusion by applying RFRA 
to appearance regulations that presumptively prohibit observant Sikh law-
                                                          
Sherwood—the complainant—filed suit after being court-martialed and 
discharged from the Navy for refusing to remove his turban and wear a 
helmet in compliance with Navy appearance regulations.136  In a short opi-
nion, the court upheld the Navy regulations by affirming the lower court’s 
application of a compelling interest test.137  Both courts concluded that the 
Navy’s interest in safety was a compelling interest.138  Addressing the ob-
servant Sikh practice of wearing a turban, and drawing on an affidavit by a 
senior naval officer, both courts concluded that the “[a]bsence of a helmet 
poses serious safety problems both for the unprotected sailor and for the 
crew that depends on him” and that “[a] turban does not meet [the] safety 
requirement necessitated by both the ordinary and extraordinary activities 
of the modern, mechanized Navy.”139  Both courts also concluded that “be-
cause all naval personnel 
safety rationale, no less restrictive alternative [to naval appearance 
tions] exists.”140 
The Significance of Bitterman and Sherwood in the Context of 
RFRA’s Legislative History 
RFRA’s legislative history uniformly contemplated that RFRA would 
reinstate the compelling interest test, as applied prior to Smith, in free exer-
cise cases.141  RFRA’s legislative history also contemplated deference to 
military judgment in RFRA challenges to military regulations.142  Bitter-
man and Sherwood were pre-Smith applications of the compelling interest 
test, and both courts upheld military appearance regulations against consti-
tutional challenge.143  The court in Bitterman expressly stated that its appli-
cation of the compelling interest test was “tempered by the substantial defe-
rence to be accorded military judgments as to the appropriate ways in 
which to further a compelling interest.”144  All of this, without more, might 
support a conclusion that RFRA does not compel the accommodation of 
observant Sikh lawyers in the U.S. Army JAG Corps.  The balance of this 
essay argues against the necessity of such a c
yers from joining the U.S. Army JAG Corps. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id.  The Court of Appeals articulated the test as follows: “Government regulations which in-
fringe protected religious practice are proscribed by the free exercise clause of the First Amendment 
unless the Government can demonstrate that the regulation is the least restrictive alternative to meet a 
compelling state need.”  Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 6 (1993); S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 8-9 (1993). 
 142  S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 12. 
 143 Bitterman v. Sec’y. of Def., 553 F. Supp. 719, 726 (D.D.C. 1982); Sherwood v. Brown, 619 
F.2d 47, 48 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 144 Bitterman, 553 F. Supp. at 724. 
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APPEARANCE REGULATIONS ELY PROHIBIT OBSERVANT 
estrictive means of furthering that compelling 
A. 
m s sincere.  As mentioned earlier in this essay, observant 
Sikh
A “substantial burden” under RFRA “must be more than an inconve-
                                             
E APPLICABILITY OF THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT T
THAT PRESUMPTIV
SIKH LAWYERS FROM JOINING THE U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE 
GENERAL CORPS 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 reads in pertinent part 
as follows: “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise 
of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability 
. . . .”145  Notwithstanding this, “[g]overnment may substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the 
burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
interest; and (2) is the least r
governmental interest.”146  The following discussion is organized around 
RFRA’s statutory language. 
Do Army Appearance Regulations Substantially Burden an Observant 
Sikh’s Exercise of Religion? 
Under RFRA, as under the First Amendment, “[r]eligious beliefs need 
not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order 
to merit . . . protection.”147  RFRA protects the “sincere exercise of reli-
gion.”148  An observant Sikh who initiates a RFRA challenge of Army ap-
pearance regulations would accordingly have to demonstrate that his prac-
tice of Sikhis  i
s wear turbans and refrain from cutting their hair in accordance with 
their religion.149 
Federal courts have offered multiple expressions of the requirement 
that contested regulations “substantially burden” a person’s exercise of re-
ligion; even still, several recurring principles emerge from these expres-
sions.150  As a threshold matter, “plaintiffs have the initial burden under 
RFRA to demonstrate that the policy in question substantially burdens the 
free exercise of their religion.”151  This initial evidentiary burden is a pre-
requisite to the government’s demonstration that its contested regulations 
further a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means.152  
             
o Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct 1211, 1220 (2006); 
oting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713)). 
Religious Freedom Res-
8 (1996). 
ton, 76 F. Supp. 2d 10, 14 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 145 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2000). 
 146 Id. 
 147 United States v. DeWitt, 95 F.3d 1374, 1374–75 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Thomas v. Review 
Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)). 
 148  Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Unia
see also DeWitt, 95 F.3d at 1375 (noting that RFRA “only protects sincerely held beliefs that are 
‘rooted in religion.’”(qu
 149 See Sardarni Premka Kaur, Rahit Maryada, in 3 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF SIKHISM 424 (Har-
bans Singh ed., 1997). 
 150 Mary Topliff, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of 
toration Act (42 USCS §§ 2000bb et seq), 135 A.L.R. FED. 121, 144–4
 151 Potter v. District of Columbia, 382 F. Supp. 2d 35, 39 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 152 Henderson v. Stan
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nience.”153  A RFRA plaintiff must show that a government regulation 
“pressur[es] him or her to commit an act forbidden by the religion or . . . 
[prevents] him or her from engaging in conduct or having a religious expe-
rience which the faith mandates.”154  Although at least one court inter-
preted the substantial burden test as applying only to religious practices that 
are mandated rather than to those which are merely encouraged,155 at least 
one other court has concluded that “a restriction on practices subjectively 
important to plaintiff’s sincerely held religiou
urden within the meaning of RFRA.”156 
Two aspects of the Army’s appearance regulations fail to comport 
with Sikh religious requirements: (1) rules regarding headgear, and (2) 
rules regarding hair.  In pertinent part, the regulations permit religious 
headdress to be worn if it is “of a style and size which can be completely 
covered by standard military headgear” but categorically forbid personnel 
from wearing religious headgear in “circumstances when the wear of mili-
tary headgear is required (for example, when the soldier is outside or re-
quired to wear headgear indoors for a special purpose).”157  Religious 
headdress cannot be worn at all if it “interfere[s] with the wear or proper 
functioning of protective clothing or equipment.”158  Although it is possible 
that an observant Sikh would consent to wearing a small head-covering159 
underneath a protective helmet as required by operational necessity, it is 
equally possible that an observant Sikh would categorically object to wear-
ing a helmet if this required him to remove any form of traditional head-
gear; this is so because observant Sikhs regard their turbans as being inse-
parable parts of their religious identity.160  With respect to such a Sikh—
faced with a choice between removing his turban and being precluded from 
the U.S. Army JAG Corps—some courts might find a substantial burden on 
religious exercise in virtue of his subjective but sincere belief that a turban 
 153 Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1121 (9th Cir. 
f it ‘puts substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his 
elie
ember’s right to wear a yarmulke.  Bitter-
an
(D.Cal. 1996). 
Y REG. 600-20, supra note 23, at 33. 
om/library/glossary/bldefpatka.htm?terms=patka (last visited Sept. 
2, 
2000) (citations omitted). 
 154 Id.; Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1222 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A statute burdens the free exer-
cise of religion i
b fs. . . . ’”). 
 155 Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 172–73 (4th Cir. 1995) See also Turner-Bey 
v. Lee, 935 F. Supp. 702, 703 (D. Md. 1996) (noting the distinction between conduct mandated by a 
religion and conduct merely encouraged but declining to decide the issue on that basis).  This approach 
accords with the approach taken in Bitterman, where a district court drew a distinction between reli-
gious preferences and religious requirements in the course of deciding whether contested appearance 
regulations unconstitutionally infringed upon an Air Force m
m  v. Sec’y. of Def., 553 F. Supp. 719, 726 (D.D.C. 1982). 
 156 Rouser v. White, 944 F. Supp. 1447, 1455 
 157 ARM
 158 Id. 
 159 One example of an alternative head-covering among Sikhs is a patka—a square cloth with four 
strings attached to each corner.  The cloth is tightly wrapped around the head and tends to be more se-
cure and compact than a traditional turban.  Some Sikh athletes wear patkas underneath their helmets.  
About.com, http://altreligion.about.c
1 2007). 
 160 Kaur, supra note 149, at 424. 
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burd
 
preserving his hair and being able to join the U.S. Army JAG Corps consti-
        
is an inseparable part of his religious identity.161  Even if a court requires 
that such an individual demonstrate that turbans are mandated rather than 
encouraged in Sikhism,162 there is ecclesiastical support for the proposition 
that turbans are required for Sikh males.163  This would likely lead a court 
to conclude that an observant Sikh
ened by a rule that requires him to remove his turban and replace it 
with a helmet. 
Observant Sikhs do not cut their hair.164  Emphasizing cleanliness, ob-
servant Sikhs keep their uncut hair combed and tied in a knot underneath 
their turbans.165  Although many observant Sikhs maintain flowing beards, 
others keep their uncut beards secured with hair gel, an elastic band, or a 
combination of both.  As with turbans, although an individual Sikh may 
have subjective religious reasons for wanting to preserve his hair in the 
face of opposition from military authorities, there is ecclesiastical support 
for the proposition that hair-cutting is prohibited in Sikhism.166  Several 
courts have, in the context of particular cases, concluded that forcing indi-
viduals to cut their hair in violation of religious requirements constitutes a 
substantial burden on the exercise of religion.167  For the foregoing reasons, 
it is likely that a court would conclude that giving a Sikh a choice between
tutes a substantial burden on his exercise of religion. 
                                                  
 161  Rouser, 944 F. Supp. at 1455. 
 162 Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 172–73 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 163 SHIROMANI GURDWARA PARBANDHAK COMMITTEE SIKH REHT MARYADA (CODE OF SIKH 
CONDUCT AND CONVENTIONS) § 4, ch. 10, art. XVI, cl. t http://www.sgpc.net/rehat_maryada/ 
section_four.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2007) [hereinafter SIKH REHT MARYADA] (“For a Sikh, there is 
no restriction or requirement as to dress except that he must wear Kachhehra . . . [a] drawer type gar-
ment fastened by a fitted string round the waist, very often worn as an underwear. . . . and turban.”) 
(emphasis added).  The Sikh Reht Maryada was first approved in 1945 by the Advisory Committee on 
Religious Matters, a constituent of the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC).  Preface 
to SIKH REHT MARYADA, CODE OF SIKH CONDUCT AND CONVENTIONS,  
http://www.sgpc.net/sikhism/code_of_conduct.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2007).  The SGPC was orga-
nized in 1925 after orthodox Sikh reformers secured the legal right to manage historic Sikh shrines.  
NESBITT, supra note 9, at 78–79.  Described as “the mini parliament of Sikhs,” the SGPC promotes 
religious and educational activities for Sikhs throughout India. SGPC Budget for 2006–07 Presented, 
PRESS TRUST OF INDIA, Mar. 30, 2006, available at http://www.accessmylibrary.com/ 
com2/summary_0286-14293491_ITM.  The Rehat Maryada was not the first codification of Sikh dis-
cipline; the earliest versions appeared in the 18th century following the death of Guru Gobind Singh.  
NESBITT, supra note 9, at 62–63. 
 164 Who is a Sikh?, supra note 9, at 121. 
 165 NESBITT, supra note 9, at 51–54. 
 166 SIKH REHT MARYADA supra note 163, at § 4, ch. 10, art. XVI, cl. i (“A Sikh should, in no way, 
harbour any antipathy to the hair of the head with which his child is born.  He should not temper [sic] 
with the hair with which the child is born. . . .  A Sikh should keep the hair of his sons and daughters 
intact.”). 
 167 See, e.g, Estep v. Dent, 914 F. Supp. 1462, 1467 (W.D. Ky. 1996) (“The court will assume for 
the purpose of this opinion that [a Hasidic Jewish inmate’s] religious convictions are authentic and 
[that] cutting his earlocks substantially burdens his faith.”); Luckette v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 471, 479 
(D. Ariz. 1995) (“Prison policies do substantially burden Plaintiff's attempts to maintain a Kosher diet, 
keep his hair at a certain length, and wear a headcovering of a particular color.”) (emphasis added).   
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 restrictive means test.170  The Army’s appearance regulations 
are d -
fety1
        
B. Do Army Appearance Regulations Further Compelling Governmental 
Interests by the Least Restrictive Means? 
The foregoing section of this essay argued that, with respect to an ob-
servant Sikh aspirant to military service in the U.S. Army JAG Corps, cer-
tain preclusive provisions of the Army’s appearance regulations constitute 
a substantial burden on said individual’s exercise of religion.  Under 
RFRA, the Army can justify such a burden only by demonstrating that its 
appearance regulations (1) further a compelling governmental interest, and 
(2) are the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.168  As sug-
gested by the Supreme Court in Gonzales,169 the plain language of RFRA 
indicates that passing the compelling interest test is a prerequisite to reach-
ing the least
esigned to promote two governmental interests: uniformity171 and sa
72 among Army personnel.  The following subsections treat each inter-
est in turn. 
1.  Does the Army Have a Compelling Interest in Uniformity? 
As noted earlier, RFRA’s legislative history uniformly contemplated 
that the compelling interest test would be applied neither “more stringently 
[n]or more leniently than it was prior to Smith.”173  Before Smith, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia in Bitterman applied a compel-
ling interest test to appearance regulations that precluded an observant Jew-
ish member of the Air Force from wearing a yarmulke.174  In the course of 
upholding the contested regulations, the District Court presaged RFRA’s 
legislative history175 by observing that its own application of the compel-
ling interest test was “tempered by the substantial deference to be accorded 
military judgments as to the appropriate ways in which to further a compel-
ling interest.”176  According to the District Court, creating exceptions to un-
iformity in the Air Force would adversely impact the efficiency of the Air 
Force,177 a compelling interest which depends on the preservation of other 
similarly compelling interests, such as discipline and esprit de corps.178  
This reasoning tracked that of the Joint Service Study Group on Religious 
Practice, which ultimately counseled against visible departures from un-
                                                  
mpelling interest test, and did not reach the 
as prong . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
RACTICE, supra note 26, at III-4. 
mmittee intends and expects 
is bill.”). 
F. Supp. at 724. 
5. 
 168 42 U.S.C § 2000bb-1 (2000). 
 169 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1219 (2006) 
(“[H]ere, the government failed on the first prong of the co
le t restrictive means 
 170 § 2000bb-1. 
 171 RELIGIOUS P
 172 Id. at III-7. 
 173 H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 7 (1993);  S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 9 (1993). 
 174 Bitterman v. Sec’y of Def., 553 F. Supp. 719, 720, 723–724 (D.D.C. 1982). 
 175 S. REP. NO. 103-111 (“[T]he courts have always extended to military authorities significant 
deference in effectuating [military] interests.  The [Senate Judiciary] [C]o
that such deference will continue under th
 176 Bitterman, 553 
 177 Id. at 724–2
 178 Id. at 724. 
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e face of a challenge by an ob-
serva
                                                          
iformity in the military.179  Without more, one might conclude that the Ar-
my could overcome a RFRA challenge to its appearance regulations
ing the instruction of RFRA’s legislative history and adopting the rea-
soning of Bitterman; however, as argued below, there is reason to doubt the 
Army’s claim that its interest in uniformity is compelling under RFRA. 
In the face of a RFRA challenge to Army appearance regulations, the 
Army must begin by asserting not merely an interest but a compelling in-
terest in preserving uniformity within its ranks.  In other words, the Army 
must assert a compelling interest in the uniform application of its appear-
ance standards—in disallowing appearance exceptions to appearance regu-
lations within its ranks.  Although the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged “that there may be instances in which a need for uniformity 
precludes the recognition of exceptions to generally applicable laws under 
RFRA,”180 the Army must affirmatively “demonstrate a compelling interest 
in uniform application of a particular program by offering evidence that 
granting the requested religious accommodations would seriously compro-
mise its ability to administer the program.”181  As discussed above, the 
Joint Study Group concluded on the basis of extensive research that un-
iformity has a psychological and behavioral impact on operational effec-
tiveness within the military.182  This research formed the basis for the Joint 
Study Group’s ultimate conclusion that “it would be unwise to permit visi-
ble exceptions to uniform dress and appearance standards.”183 By implica-
tion, this research forms the basis for an argument against the accommoda-
tion of observant Sikhs in the Army JAG Corps.  Without more, and to the 
extent that the Army adopts the reasoning of the Joint Study Group, it is 
conceivable that the Army would carry its burden of demonstrating a com-
pelling interest in preserving uniformity in th
nt Sikh aspirant to JAG Corps service.  Notwithstanding this, Gon-
zales offers a roadmap for demonstrating that the Army’s asserted interest 
in preserving uniformity is not compelling. 
In Gonzales, the U.S. Supreme Court applied RFRA to the federal 
government’s application of the Controlled Substances Act to a religious 
sect whose beliefs require the consumption of a regulated hallucinogen.184   
The government asserted “a compelling interest in the uniform application 
of the Controlled Substances Act, such that no exception to the ban on use 
of the hallucinogen [could] be made to accommodate the sect’s sincere re-
ligious practice.”185  In response, the Court noted that the government itself 
had previously recognized an exception to the Controlled Substances Act 
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1224 (2006). 
TICE, supra note 26, at III-4. 
zales, 126 S. Ct at 1216. 
 179 RELIGIOUS PRACTICE, supra note 26, at III-19. 
 180 Gonzales v. O’
 181 Id. at 1223. 
 182 RELIGIOUS PRAC
 183 Id. at III-19. 
 184 Gon
 185 Id. 
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xception to a generally applicable law.”188  On these grounds, 
the C
ilitary appear-
                                                          
for religion-based peyote use among Native Americans.186  The peyote ex-
ception, according to the Court, “fatally undermine[d] the government’s 
broader contention that the Controlled Substances Act establishes a closed 
regulatory system that admits of no exceptions under RFRA.”187  Further-
more, according to the Court, “the [g]overnment’s argument for uniformity 
. . . rest[ed] not so much on the particular statutory program at issue as on 
slippery-slope concerns that could be invoked in response to any RFRA 
claim for an e
ourt ultimately concluded that the government failed to demonstrate a 
compelling interest in barring the sect’s religious use of the hallucinogen at 
issue.189 
With respect to the issue of uniformity, what Gonzales teaches is that 
an asserted interest in uniformity is not compelling to the extent that excep-
tions are made to the asserted interest.  In other words, if the Army asserts a 
compelling interest in preserving uniformity through uniform application of 
its appearance standards, its assertion is undercut to the extent it can be 
shown that exceptions are being made to the uniform application of its ap-
pearance standards.  There are, in fact, several such exceptions.  Most per-
tinently, the U.S. Army has accommodated observant Sikhs, even after the 
implementation of preclusive appearance regulations.190  This directly un-
dermines the Army’s argument that it has a compelling interest in disallow-
ing exceptions to its appearance standards.  Military authorities have sug-
gested that uniformity has a psychological and behavioral impact on 
operational effectiveness within the military.191  If the presence of obser-
vant Sikhs in the Army has not already undermined its operational effec-
tiveness, it is not obvious why admitting additional Sikhs would do so in 
the future; an argument to the contrary would be in the nature of a slippery-
slope, which was rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Gonzales as a legi-
timate foundation for demonstrating a compelling governmental interest.192  
The Army’s dress regulations aim to “maintain uniformity” within the Ar-
my and ensure that personnel “avoid an extreme or unm
 
ut history: If I make an exception for you, I’ll have to make one for everybody, so 
ng as the soldier remains otherwise qualified for retention.”  
RM
6, at 4. 
 186 Id. at 1222.
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. at 1223.  Put another way, “[t]he [g]overnment’s argument echoes the classic rejoinder of 
bureaucrats througho
no exceptions.”  Id. 
 189 Id. at 1225. 
 190 Manbir Singh Chowdhary, Interview with Colonel G.B. Singh, 17 SIKHSPECTRUM.COM Q. 
(2004), http://www.sikhspectrum.com/082004/gbsingh_int.htm. The author communicated with Col. 
G.B. Singh (retired), an observant Sikh who served in the U.S. Army after the implementation of prec-
lusive appearance regulations, and learned that he retired on August 1, 2007.  Email from Colonel G.B. 
Singh to Rajdeep Singh Jolly (Oct. 3, 2007, 08:46:08 PST) (on file with author).  Although the Army 
has generally ruled out religion-based exceptions to its appearance regulations for uncut hair, Army 
Regulations provide that “policy exceptions based on religious practice given to soldiers . . . on or prior 
to 1 January 1986 remain in effect as lo
A Y REG. 670.1, supra note 96, at 2–3. 
 191 RELIGIOUS PRACTICE, supra note 2
 192 See Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 1223. 
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inter eans test,197 
and i
                                      
ance.”193  The presence of observant Sikhs in the Army suggests that they 
have successfully avoided “an extreme or unmilitary appearance,” and it is 
not clear why additional Sikh could not do the same. 
Apart from the presence of at least some observant Sikhs in the U.S. 
Army, the Army’s own appearance standards admit of additional excep-
tions with respect to facial hair, which is an integral part of an observant 
Sikh’s religious identity.  Although Army regulations require males to 
“keep their face[s] clean-shaven when in uniform or in civilian clothes on 
duty,” an exception is provided when “appropriate medical authority pre-
scribes beard growth.”194  As well, males are allowed to keep mustaches.195  
If non-Sikh Army personnel can maintain facial hair without undermining
uniformity to the detriment of operational effectiveness, it is not clear why 
Sikh personnel would do so by maintaining facial hair in accordance with 
their religious beliefs. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Army does not have a compelling inter-
est in preserving uniformity by excluding observant Sikhs from its ranks.  
If, as this essay suggests, the Army cannot demonstrate that its appearance 
regulations further a compelling governmental interest in preserving un-
iformity, it is neither necessary nor even possible to determine whether 
those regulations satisfy RFRA’s least restrictive means test.  According to 
RFRA, “[g]overnment may substantially burden a person’s exercise of reli-
gion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the 
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental inter-
est.”196  The plain language of RFRA implies that passing the compelling 
est test is a prerequisite to reaching the least restrictive m
t is demonstrably the case that the Army has not asserted a compelling 
interest in disallowing appearance exceptions to its appearance regulations. 
2.  Does the Army Have a Compelling Interest in Safety? 
As noted earlier, RFRA’s legislative history uniformly contemplated 
that the compelling interest test would be applied neither “more stringently 
[n]or more leniently than it was prior to Smith.”198  Before Smith, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Sherwood applied the compelling 
interest test to Navy appearance regulations that formed the basis for the 
discharge of an observant Sikh who refused to wear a safety helmet in 
compliance with said regulations.199  The court in Sherwood noted that 
safety helmets are designed to protect sailors from violent impacts and that 
                    
. 670.1, supra note 96, at 5. 
t 3. 
. REP. NO. 103-88 (1993); S. REP. NO. 103-111(1993). 
rwood v. Brown, 619 F.2d 47, 48 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 193 ARMY REG
 194 Id. at 3. 
 195 Id. a
 196 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 197 Id. 
 198 H.R
 199 She
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r.”203  What this 
essay
ance
my’s co n promoting safety. 
 wearing a turban in uniform.  
The 
turbans do not afford such protection.200  On this ground, the court in 
Sherwood concluded that the Navy’s interest in promoting safety within its 
ranks was compelling.201  This essay does not argue against this conclu-
sion.  Neither does this essay argue against the importance of requiring the 
use of other protective equipment, particularly gas masks.  As noted by the 
Joint Service Study Group on Religious Practice, safety standards not only 
“directly affect the individual’s health and well-being,”202 but also “affect 
the ability of the individual to perform a task.  This, in turn, influences the 
accomplishment of the unit’s mission in both peace and wa
 argues against, however, is the proposition that the Army’s appear-
 regulations constitute the least restrictive means of promoting the Ar-
ncededly compelling interest i
3. Do Army Appearance Regulations Constitute the Least Restrictive 
Means of Promoting Safety? 
One court explained the least restrictive means inquiry as follows: 
“[i]f the compelling state [interest] can be accomplished despite the exemp-
tion of a particular individual, then a regulation which denies an exemption 
is not the least restrictive means of furthering the state interest.”204  The 
court in Sherwood concluded that the helmet requirement at issue in that 
case was the least restrictive means of promoting safety among Navy per-
sonnel because allowing an observant Sikh to wear a turban in place of a 
protective helmet “poses serious safety problems both for the unprotected 
sailor and for the crew that depends on him.”205  In other words, in the view 
of the court in Sherwood, it would have been impossible for the Navy to 
assure the safety of an observant Sikh sailor—or even the safety of his col-
leagues—if he were allowed to wear a turban in place of a protective hel-
met while on duty.206  This essay agrees that the Army has a compelling 
interest in promoting safety among its personnel, including JAG Corps of-
ficers, who have been deployed in such dangerous settings as Vietnam and 
Iraq.207  This essay also agrees with the result in Sherwood; however, as 
explained below, the result in Sherwood need not be replicated in every 
case in which an observant Sikh insists on
complainant in Sherwood refused to wear any helmet, but it is con-
ceivable that observant Sikhs will wear helmets as safety requires, as long 
as they can also wear some form of turban. 
As indicated earlier, at least some observant Sikh officers have served 
                                                          
 200 Id. 
RACTICE, supra note 26, at III-7–8. 
 1272–73 (9th Cir. 1984). 
wood, 619 F.2d at 48. 
VOCATES IN COMBAT: ARMY LAWYERS IN MILITARY OPERATIONS FROM VIETNAM 
 H
 201 Id. 
 202 RELIGIOUS P
 203 Id. at III-8. 
 204 Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d 1269,
 205 Sher
 206 Id. 
 207 See Christopher W. Behan, Book Note, 174 MIL. L. REV. 180 (2002) (reviewing FREDERIC L. 
BORCH, JUDGE AD
TO AITI (2001)). 
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who wears a yarmulke underneath a helmet.212  If 
turba
can properly wear a gas mask over his uncut beard.215  In order to succeed 
       
in the U.S. Army after the implementation of preclusive appearance regula-
tions.208  Their presence in the Army is evidence that religious require-
ments are compatible with safety requirements.  By law, members of the 
U.S. military are allowed to wear religious apparel if wearing it does not 
“interfere with the performance of the member’s military duties. . . .”209  
For example, according to the Department of Defense, “[a] yarmulke may 
be worn with the uniform whenever a military cap, hat, or other headgear is 
not prescribed.”210  Even when other headgear is prescribed, “[a] yarmulke 
may also be worn underneath military headgear as long as it does not inter-
fere with the proper wearing . . . [or] functioning . . . of the prescribed 
headgear.”211  As mentioned earlier, observant Sikhs keep their uncut hair 
combed and tied underneath a turban, which can range in style, size, and 
fit.  In situations where safety helmets are required, it is possible for an ob-
servant Sikh to wear a helmet over a smaller and tighter headdress; this 
practice can be observed among Sikh athletes and would be analogous to 
that of an observant Jew 
ns can be worn underneath helmets without subjecting their wearers to 
more danger than normal, then the Army cannot justifiably argue that disal-
lowing any form of turban constitutes the least restrictive means of promot-
ing its interest in safety. 
Although the Department of Defense allows military members to wear 
religious apparel in certain circumstances, it officially excludes hair from 
its definition of “religious apparel.”213  This exclusion may have been mo-
tivated by concerns about the ability of bearded individuals to properly 
wear protective gas masks.  According to the Joint Service Study Group on 
Religious Practice, it is not possible for a bearded individual to properly wear 
a gas mask.214  Accordingly, even if an observant Sikh demonstrates that he 
can properly wear a safety helmet over a turban, it is not obvious that he 
                                                   
. § 774(b)(1) (2000). 
 each corner.  The cloth is tightly wrapped around the head and tends to be more secure and 
m  wear patkas underneath their helmets.  See supra 
e in greater danger of being subjected to 
 tests for gas 
 208 See supra note 190. 
 209 10 U.S.C
 210 DIRECTIVE NO. 1300.17, supra note 20, at 3. 
 211 Id. at 3. 
 212 Many Sikh men can be observed wearing patkas.  A patka is a square cloth with four strings 
attached to
co pact than a traditional turban.  Some Sikh athletes
note 159. 
 213 DIRECTIVE NO. 1300.17, supra note 20, at 3. 
 214 RELIGIOUS PRACTICE, supra note 26, at 15.  This observation might explain the following pro-
vision of the Army’s appearance regulations: “[S]oldiers previously granted authority to wear unshorn 
hair, unshorn beard, or permanent religious jewelry will not be assigned permanent change of station or 
temporary duty out of [the continental United States] due to health and safety considerations.” ARMY 
REG. 600-20, supra note 23, at 34 (emphasis added).  This provision appears to assume that military 
personnel deployed outside the Continental United States ar
attacks that imperil their health and safety.  This assumption might appropriately be questioned in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 
 215  Potter v. District of Columbia, No. 01-1189, 2007 WL 2892685 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2007).  In 
Potter, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that local fire department regula-
tions requiring religiously bearded individuals to shave violated RFRA.  Id. at *1.  In the course of 
doing so, the court noted that some  religiously bearded plaintiffs repeatedly passed safety
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observant 
Sikh
t Sikhs.  
This
under RFRA, the U.S. Army would have to demonstrate that an 
 cannot wear a gas mask without imperiling himself or those around 
him; if such a demonstration fails, this failure could prove that the Army 
can promote safety without impairing the exercise of Sikhism. 
As indicated earlier, many observant Sikhs secure their uncut beards 
with hair gel, elastic cords, or a combination of both; the effect is to fix a 
beard closely to the contours of the face.  It is accordingly possible that an 
observant Sikh could modify his beard in such a way as to enable the for-
mation of a protective seal for the purpose of properly wearing a gas mask.  
Additionally, as mentioned earlier, the Army allows personnel to maintain 
beards when “appropriate medical authority prescribes beard growth.”216  If 
Army personnel are permitted to maintain beards for medical reasons, and 
if such personnel can properly wear gas masks, then it might be possible 
for observant Sikhs to do so.  That there already are observant Sikhs in the 
U.S. Army might constitute additional evidence that Sikh religious re-
quirements are compatible with safety requirements.  Significantly, howev-
er, these Sikhs are “not [to] be assigned permanent change of station or 
temporary duty out of . . . [the continental United States] due to health and 
safety considerations.”217  This assignment restriction may have been mo-
tivated by concerns about exposing observant Sikhs to environments in 
which the use of gas masks would be more than a remote possibility.  Be-
cause JAG Corps officers are deployed around the world,218 observant Sikh 
members of the JAG Corps could find themselves in environments of the 
sort that military officials determined would be unsafe for observan
 determination argues against the accommodation of observant Sikhs in 
the U.S. Army JAG Corps; however, as explained below, the foregoing ar-
gument need not be regarded as fatal to a case for accommodation. 
The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense has adopted a more inclu-
sive approach to religious accommodation than the United States, and this 
approach provides useful guidance in regard to facial hair and gas 
masks.219  This approach also poses potential obstacles to observant Sikh 
aspirants to military service in the United States.  According to the Ministry 
of Defense’s Guide on Religion and Belief in the MOD and Armed Forces, 
Sikhs in the United Kingdom are permitted to serve in their nation’s armed 
forces and are permitted to maintain uncut hair.220  Notwithstanding this, 
Sikhs must maintain “short neatly trimmed beards” that must be modified 
or removed “to such an extent as to enable the correct wearing of a respira-
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an observant Sikh is a matte science; however, to the ex-
tent that the British approach  observe his religious tradi-
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tor or breathing app
tive seal on a respirator can only be achieved when the skin is clean 
shaven.  In an operational environment (including training in preparation 
for operational deployment) where there is a [nuclear, biological, or chemi-
cal] threat Muslims, Sikhs and indeed all personnel with beards, would 
need to shave.”222 
The Guide requires Sikhs to trim their beards and also asserts that an 
effective respiratory seal can only be achieved on clean-shaven skin; how-
ever, the requirement appears to be motivated by the assertion.223  The 
Guide might plausibly be read to suggest that an effective respiratory seal 
can only be achieved when facial hair does not “come[ ] between the seal-
ing surface of the facepiece and the face. . . .”224  If an observant Sikh can 
modify his beard—and do so without trim
ent facial hair from interrupting the formation of a respiratory seal, 
then the Guide itself might have gone too far in prescribing that observant 
Sikhs trim their beards.  In other words, Sikh aspirants to military service should 
not be presumed to be incapable of safely wearing gas masks without being given 
an opportunity to demonstrate such capability. 
If the Guide does not go too far—if it is plainly impossible for a 
bearded individual to properly wear a gas mask without shaving his beard 
to some extent—then, at best, the Guide embodies an approach to safety 
that enables observant Sikhs to undertake military service without sacrific-
ing all of their visible religious commitments, as they presumptively must 
in order to join the U.S. Army JAG Corps.  If the U.S. Army adopted the 
British approach to religious accommodation, then observant Sikh person-
nel would likely be able to wear turbans, maintain uncut hair, and maintain 
at least some facial hair.  Whether this concession would be
r for his own con
 enables a Sikh to
 and safely wear a gas mask, it appears to demonstrate that existing 
Army regulations regarding facial hair and gas masks are not the least re-
strictive means of promoting safety among Army personnel. 
CONCLUSION 
Observant Sikh lawyers do not presumptively enjoy the right to join 
the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps because Sikh reli-
gious requirements do not comport with the Army’s appearance regula-
tions. This essay argued that the Army’s appearance regulations violate the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).  Under RFRA, government 
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at they can safely wear smaller turbans underneath their helmets when 
elmets must be worn and should be permitted to demonstrate that they can 
safely wear gas masks when gas masks must be worn.  Because the Army’s 
appearance regulations violate RFRA, they must be amended to allow for 
the accommodation of observant Sikhs in the U.S. Army JAG Corps. 
 
 
                                                          
may substantially burden an individual’s exercise of religion only if it de-
monstrates that its application of the burden furthers a compelling govern-
mental interest by the least restrictive means.225  The Army’s appearance 
regulations aim to promote two interests—uniformity and safety.  In the 
course of furthering those interests, the Army’s appearance regulations also 
prevent observant Sikhs from joining the U.S. Army JAG Corps.  Obser-
vant Sikh males wear turbans and refrain from cutting their hair.  Both re-
quirements purportedly interfere with the Army’s interests in uniformity 
and safety.  This essay argued to the contrary by demonstrating (1) that, 
under RFRA, the Army does not have a compelling interest in disallowing 
appearance exceptions to its appearance regulations, and (2) that, under 
RFRA, the Army’s appearance regulations do not constitute the least re-
strictive means of promoting safety.  With respect to uniformity, the pres-
ence of observant Sikhs in the Army and the Army’s own flexible approach 
to its appearance regulations undercut the notion that the Army has a com-
pelling interest in disallowing exceptions to its appearance regulations.  
With respect to safety, observant Sikhs should be permitted to demon
th
h
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